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COMMENTS

BANKS AND BANKING-LIABILITY FOR MISREPRESENTING
DEPOSITS OF CUSTOMERS TO THIRD PARTY
The plaintiff was a surety company whose basis for action was
a loss which it contended was caused by a misrepresentation of the
cashier of defendant bank. The Van Dyke Construction Company
requested the plaintiff to execute bonds guaranteeing the performance
of certain construction contracts and the payment of bills for labor
and materials involved in the performance of those contracts. At
the time Van Dyke applied for the bonds it delivered to the plaintiff
a statement purporting to set forth its financial condition which indicated it had on deposit with the defendant, Plantsville Bank, a cash
balance of $53,455.60. At the same time Van Dyke delivered to
the plaintiff a letter on the stationery of the Plantsville Bank signed
by "E. L. Sullivan, Cashier." Sullivan was then cashier of the bank
and his signature was genuine. He also at that time was a stockholder
of Van Dyke, owning 530 of 600 preferred shares. The letter stated
that the balance of Van Dyke was $53,455.60, and that it had been
granted a credit line by the bank of $150,000. The plaintiff sent a
letter to the defendant bank requesting confirmation of that balance
to which it received no reply. The plaintiff renewed its request two
weeks later, and the bank sent a telegram confirming the balance,
and subsequently a letter of which the following is the body:
"Re: Van Dyke Construction Company
The above concern has carried a substantial account with us
for the past two months, balance being maintained of approximately the amount of $43,455.60 mentioned in your letter of
Nov. 2."
M. L. Ensle
Asst. Cashier
The signature of "M. L. Ensle" was a forgery perpetrated by Sullivan, the cashier of the bank, and the real writer of the letter. Van
Dyke did not in fact have a balance with the bank of any amount
nor had the bank granted the company a credit line. Three weeks
later the plaintiff executed a performance bond for Van Dyke in
the sum of $200,000. Thereafter Van Dyke defaulted in the performance of the construction contracts and failed to pay certain
obligations incurred for labor, services and materials. The plaintiff
had to pay on the bonds a loss in the neighborhood of $50,000. The
assistant manager of the plaintiff testified that it relied on the representations as to the deposit with the bank and the line of credit in
furnishing the bonds, and also said that the bonds would not have
been written had it not been for the representation. The application
to the plaintiff by Van Dyke stated that its assets, in addition to the
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non-existent deposit, were $1,700 while its liabilities at that time
aggregated almost $4000. Held: The cashier when answering the
inquiries addressed to the bank was acting within the apparent scope
of his authority and the defendant bank would be liable for the
cashier's misrepresentations if such misrepresentations were the proximate cause of the damage. Judgment was granted for the defendants
on the ground that there was no proof of damage proximately resulting from the bank's fraud. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of
New York v. Plantsville Nat. Bank et al, 158 Fed. 2d, 422 (C.C.A.
2d, 1946).
The case presents two distinct questions: First, whether the bank
is liable for the misrepresentation of its cashier made solely for his
own benefit, and Second, was the loss proximately caused by the
misrepresentation, and what proof is relevant and necessary to establish that fact.
As to the first question: The trend of modern legislation and
judicial decisions has been to enlarge the employer's liability, rather
than to curtail it.' Many of the antecedent limitations on the doctrine of respondeat superior are being eliminated. It was English
law that to make the principal liable in a case of fraud of its agent,
it was necessary to show that the act was not merely within the
apparent scope of his employment but also for the benefit of the
principal.2 The United States Supreme Court at one time indicated
a tendency toward the English doctrine in Friedlanderv. Texas Pac.
Railroad Co. 3 But at the same time, general American law did not
require that the fraud be for the principal's benefit. 4 However, should
the third person dealing with the agent know that the agent may be
acting in his own behalf, such circumstances should put the third
party on inquiry.5
The House of Lords overruled the Englsih doctrine that a principal is not liable for the fraud of an agent unless benefited by the
fraud in 1912.0 The principals liability for his agent's contracts has
never been thus limited.7 The House of Lords in overruling the
doctrine assimilated the fraud cases to the contract cases in that the
motive of the agent, which is material in creating other tort liability,
"Gleason v. Seaboard Airline R. Co., 278 U.S. 349 (1922).
2British Mut. Banking Co. v. Charnwood, 18 Q.B.D. 714 (1902); 18 Harvard
Law Rev. 144 (1904).
3 Friedlander et. al. v. Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. 130 U. S. 416 (1888).
4 New York Railroad v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (1865); Tome v. Parkensburg
Branch R.R., 39 Md. 36 (1873).
5 Moore v. Citizen's Nat. Bank, 111 U.S. 156 (1883); Farrington v. South Boston
R. R. Co., 150 Mass. 406, 23 N.E. 109 (1890).
6Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co. A.C. 716 (1912); 26 Harvard Law Rev. 449
(1913).
7 Hambro v. Burnand, 2 K.B. 10 (1904) ; North River Bank v. Ayenor, 3(Hill)
N.Y. 262 (1842).
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has in the fraud cases no logical bearing. The question, they said,
should be resolved against the principal where the defrauded party
has dealt with an agent whose acts are of the very kind he is employed to do.
'the old English doctrine also has been repudiated by the United
States Supreme Court, and Friedlander v. Texas Pac. RR. Co. distinguished and in effect overruled." Justice Stone stated in the
Gleason case:
"The doctrine that a principal shall be held liable for the fraudulent representation of his agent made within the scope of the
agent's authority is not subject to an exception exonerating the
principal where the agent acts with the secret purpose to benefit
only himself and without the knowledge or consent of the
principal."
Again that case would appear to hold that a similar act of an
agent which was merely negligent in nature, as distinguished from
fraudulent, would also expose the principal to liability.
That the state courts generally hold that the principal need not
benefit from the fraud of the agent to be liable is seen in many cases.9
Therefor it seems that generally today the fraudulent acts of the
agent in most courts of the country need not be for the benefit
of the principal to expose the latter to liability for the results.
Next the question arises whether the act was within the apparent
scope of the authority of the cashier. The cashier is the proper
officer to receive deposits and to give certificates and vouchers in
respect thereto.10 Today, somewhat contrary to general opinion, banks
do, in their normal course of business, gratuitously give information
as to the deposits of their customers, and other credit information.
The practice has become almost a necessary function, due to the ex-tensive use of credit by the people of our country.
Perhaps in conflict with practice, the law says that Banks owe
a general duty of secrecy as to customers affairs except where under
legal compulsion."' However it has been held that where a bank
gave the financial standing of a corporation to a third party, which
information resulted in an injury to the corporation, the bank was
not liable if the report was true and there was no malice.' 2 It appears that the giving of credit information by a cashier is an act that
may be within the scope of his lawful authority. An interesting case
8

Supra, note No. 1.
9 Planter's Rice-Mill Co. v. Merchant's Nat'l. Bank, 78 Ga. 574, 3 S.E. 327
(1887); McCord v. Western Union, 39 Minn. 181, 39 N.W. 315 (1888); Fifth
Ave. Bank v. Forty-second St. R.R. Co., 137 N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 378 (1893).
10 Morse, Banks & Banking (3rd Ed.) Sec. 161 (1888).
11
Patton's Digest, Banks & Banking (1926 Ed.) Vol. 1, Sec. 565.
12 Patton's Digest, Banks & Banking (1926 Ed.) Vol. II, Sec. 3053 (a).
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however which dissents from this view somewhat held that a bank
was not liable for a fraudulent representation of its cashier who
was also an officer of the corporation in regard to which the information was given.' 3 This case is almost in point with the principal
case, but does not concur with the weight of authority.
It must further be observed that the giving of such credit information is a mere voluntary courtesy. The recipient thereof is in
no wise entitled to it. Patton in his Banks and Banking has expressed this point by saying that "Banks are not in the information
business". 14 Also, as a general rule, statements made by a bank officer concerning any past transactions within his scope of authority
will not be regarded as binding upon the bank. They are mere courtesy. The officer owes no duty to the bank to answer interrogatories
which relate only to a completed transaction. He is not employed
for that purpose or held out by the bank as instructed with that duty.
For such the bank is not generally liable. 15 However, the result may
be different if the officer knows that the information is to be used
and relied upon. 16
When an officer of a bank makes a statement of opinion as to
the condition of a company the bank is on safer ground than where
he makes representations as to a customer's deposits in the bank. In
the former case reliance on an opinion of an officer is hard to justify, whereas statements concerning deposits in the officer's bank are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the cashier and therefor warrant
reliance. Thus statements of a bank officer as to deposits where
negligently 1 or fraudulently incorrect generally expose the bank to
liability. On the other hand statements of officers concerning their
opinion as to the financial condition of individuals or corporations
are not to be relied upon, and for injuries caused by such statements
banks will not as a rule be liable. Judge Clark has said in regard
to such a statement, "that the cashier was not at the time acting in
respect to some interest or business of the bank; his response being
a mere voluntary statement, having no relation to any business trans8
action with the bank".'
'1

Hadden et. al. v. Dooley et. al., 92 F. 274 (1899), Affirmed on Rehearing, 93 F.
728 (1899) ; Hoover v. Wise, 91 U.S. 308 (1874).

'14 Digest of Legal Opinions of Thorn. B. Patton (1921 Ed.) Sec. 500 at page 100;

Consolidated Milling Co. v. Fogo, 104 Wis. 92, 80 N.W. 103 (1899); Lemke v.
First Nat. Bank of Appleton 190 Wis. 223, 208 N.W. 946 (1926).
15 Franklin Bank v. Steward et. al. 37 Me. 519 (1853) ; Pres. Directors & Co.
of Lime Rock Bank v. Hewett, 52 Me. 53 (1861); Morse on Banks and Banking (3rd Ed. 1888) Sec. 103 (b), at page 227; U.S. v. City Bank 21 How
356 (1858), Cashier represented corporation solvent when not: Helds Bank not
liable, no part of cashier's business to give such information.

16 De Swarte v. First Nat. Bank of Wauwatosa, 188 Wis. 455, 206 N.W. 887
(1925).
17 Krause v. Busacker, 105 Wis. 350, 81 N.W. 406 (1900).
18 First Nat. Bank of Manistee Mich. v. Marshall & Ilseley Bank of Milwaukee,
28 C.C.A. 42, 83 Fed. 725 (C.C.A. 6th. 1897).
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It is interesting to note the precautions taken by banks to avoid
liability for errors in information gratuitously given. In some situations courts appear to have permitted credit agencies to contract
against their own negligences, even where the information is being
sold and not given gratuitously as is *usually the case with banks.1 9
The following is an example of a warning currently printed on
the credit stationery of one bank. It seems to cover everything necessary except information concerning deposits:
"All persons are informed that any Statement on the part of
this Bank or any of its Officers as to the Responsibility or
Standing of any Person, Firm or Corporation, or as to the
value of any property or Securities, is a mere Matter of Opinion
and given as such, and solely as a matter of Courtesy, and
for which No Responsibility, in any way, is to attach to this
Bank or any of its Officers."
No inquirer receiving information on such a form should successfully contend that he had a right to rely on the information, and if
injured seek indemnity from the bank. However the statement does
not appear to cover the possibilities which arise from information
related to the deposits of customers.
As to the reliance of a third party on such information, it must
be that of a man of ordinary prudence30 If the third party knows
the agent to be interested in a favorable report, such party is not
entitled to rely on the statement. But the action of the third party
which causes his loss need not be induced solely by the misrepresentation of the bank, although the latter must have materially affected his action.2 ' It would appear that if it is a statement concerning a deposit, the third party may rely completely upon its correctness.
The question is discussed whether it is good for business to save
banks harmless for the results of such erroneous information. On
the other hand it is submitted that since the bank is under no obligation to give such information, exposure to severe liability might well
move banks to refrain from giving it at all. This could materially
affect business since so many organizations must rely on such information to carry on their trade on a credit basis.
After determining in the principal case that the bank could be
liable for the fraud of its agent because within the scope of his
apparent authority, the court proceeded to the question whether the
misrepresentation involved was a proximate cause of the loss.
19 City Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Dun et. al., 51 Fed. 160 (1892), Reversed,
58 Fed. 174 (1893).
20 Morse, Banks and Banking (3rd Ed., 1888) Sec. 105, Page 230.
21
Hindman v. First Nat. Bank of Louisville, 112 F. 931 (C.C.A. 6th, 1902) ; Cook
on Corporations, Sec. 355; Morgan v. Skiddy, 62 N.Y. 319 (1875); N.Y. Land
Improvement Co. v. Chapman, 118 N.Y. 288, 23 N.E. 187 (1890).
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The assistant manager of the plaintiff testified that were it not
for the misrepresentation of the defendant's agent ,the plaintiff would
not have executed the bond. But the court held there was no necessarily causal relation between the fraud and the plaintiff's loss, and
that the proofs left the cause of the Construction Company's failure
a mystery. What proof is necessary in this type of case to satisfy
the requirements of proximate cause? So far as the element of causation is concerned, any loss which follows naturally upon a transaction into which the plaintiff has been induced by misrepresentation
may be said to have been caused by it; but the same considerations
which limit liability in cases of tortious harm to interests of personalty have operated in cases of business damage. If the misrepresentation was a substantial factor in bringing about the result,
it will be regarded as a cause in fact. Of course it will be such a
substantial factor if the result would not have occurred without it.2
The instant case drops into the shadowy field of fraud where
a defendant is asked to "make good" a representation. The plaintiff failed here to prove that the loss would not have occurred had
the representation been true. This was apparently the burden placed
by the court upon the plaintiff, and since he failed to sustain it the
court held the defendant would not have to make its representation
good by payment of -damages.
WILLiAm P. McENIRY

22

Prosser on Torts, (Hornbook, 1941), P. 321, "Causation in Fact."

